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INTRODUCTION 
Within a month of each other, at the end of 1979, one internal settlement 
ended and another began. The Rhodesian internal settlement, which was specifi-
cally referred to by that label by its architects, ended with the signing of the 
Lancaster House Agreements on 21 December 1979. On 3 January 1980 anew junta 
was created in El Salvador with the participation of Jose Napoleon Duarte and the 
Christian Democratic Party. Applying the theory that this author developed for 
Southern African internal settlements, this article will compare the internal settle-
ments in Rhodesia and El Salvador. 
In 1977 Rhodesian rebel Prime Minister Ian Smith coined the term "internal 
settlement," by which he meant a settlement between the ruling white minority 
regime and internal black leaders which bypassed the "external leaders" — those 
affiliated with the guerrillas who were in exile. This concept also held true for 
Namibia and South Africa. By changing the definition of internal settlement 
slightly, from racial to class terms, this concept can be applied throughout the Third 
World and even to Europe (Northern Ireland, for example). 
What follows in this article is first an exposition of the elements of an internal 
settlement. Then the theory is illustrated by the Rhodesian case. Next, it is applied 
to El Salvador, and the Rhodesian and Salvadoran cases are compared by compo-
nents. Finally, in the summary the outlines of the Central American internal 
settlement are covered and suggestions for further application of the model 
elsewhere are made. The purpose of this article is to attempt to show that the theory 
of internal settlements — why they occur and why they fail — is valid for areas 
beyond Southern Africa.' 
INTERNAL SETTLEMENTS: A THEORY 
For the purposes of this article the following definition of internal settlement 
will apply: 
A regime which comes to power through an accord between an 
incumbent minority regime and leaders from the majority for the 
purpose of granting the existing regime greater legitimacy, both 
internally and externally, but involving terms falling short of those 
demanded by the external leaders affiliated with the insurgency. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the internal settlement is the normal 
political counterinsurgency response of white settler regimes in Southern Africa to 
insurgencies by the black majority.2 By altering only slightly the definition of 
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internal settlement, it can be argued that internal settlements have occurred or may 
occur in other regions outside of Southern Africa. Because there is a long history 
in Latin America of whites and mestizos (mixed-race persons of European-Indian 
derivation) leading political parties that are supported by Indians, mestizos and 
blacks — that is by non-whites — which is generally lacking in Southern Africa, 
internal settlements must be defined in class terms rather than in racial terms, 
although in many places there is considerable overlap between racial and class 
distinctions.3 Therefore, for the purposes of this article an internal settlement will 
be defined as a political settlement whereby the external nationalists connected with 
the guerrillas are excluded from a settlement while selected leaders of the majority 
classes are included. The majority classes are the peasants and urban workers which 
are predominantly Indian and mestizo by race. 
In Southern Africa internal settlements take place between white settler 
regimes, the Rhodesians and the South Africans, and internal black leaders either 
formerly connected with the armed struggle of the guerrillas and/or system 
politicians involved in the framework that whites have set up for black representa-
tion. In Central America internal settlements take place between the military and 
popular parties such as the Christian Democrats.4 In both Southern Africa and in El 
Salvador the military was the instrument of the whites — the settlers and the 
oligarchy. In both regions internal settlements involve a formal handing over or 
sharing of power in a junta followed by elections for a parliament or national 
assembly but with the former powers maintaining real control through hidden 
means of control or quite openly through various clauses in the new constitution. 
Internal settlements come about as a response to a viable insurgency that 
taxes the resources of the regime to a point where an external colonial power would 
have made peace with the insurgents through withdrawal. However, because the 
ruling regime is local, as opposed to the commercial and settler colonies in Africa 
and Asia ruled from Europe, it prefers to endure by attempting to broaden its base 
of support. This is done by creating a facade of majority rule, while the existing 
regime continues to exercise real power, through the inclusion of leaders from the 
majority. In Southern Africa the lifting or avoidance of economic sanctions was the 
prime motivator behind the internal settlement. For the purposes of Central 
America and elsewhere this negative incentive can be transformed into a positive 
one, the attraction of foreign economic and military aid. 
Internal settlements may have up to three basic goals. The first is to avoid 
or end economic sanctions or to win foreign economic and military aid. The second 
is to win popular support for the regime by coopting popular figures. The third is 
to cause defections from the ranks of the guerrillas. In Southern Africa all the 
internal settlements so far implemented have failed in all of these three goals.5 They 
failed for a number of reasons. In the case of Namibia and South Africa the leading 
figures involved in the internal settlements lacked widespread popular support to 
begin with. In all three African countries the black rulers or participants lacked real 
political power and authority and were hesitant to use what authority they did have 
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under the new constitutions. In all three the military and police continued to remain 
under the control of their former commanders and continued to behave in their usual 
repressive manner. This involved massacres, torture, kidnappings, and disregard 
for civilian casualties when raiding villages where guerrillas were believed to be 
hiding. And finally there was considerable international and domestic pressure on 
the leading Western countries not to lift economic sanctions. 
RHODESIA AND EL SALVADOR: A COMPARISON 
Rhodesia was founded by 200 white settlers in a pioneer column in Septem-
ber 1890 on the basis of a prospecting concession that mining mogul Cecil J. Rhodes 
had bought from Ndebele King Lobengula in 1888. Lobengula's kingdom was 
overthrown three years later and a combined Ndebele-Shona rebellion severely 
repressed in 1896. Prior to 1923 the colony was ruled by the British South Africa 
Company, and from then until 1965 it was ruled by the local settlers as a self-
governing British colony under "responsible government." Between November 
1965 and December 1979 it had de facto independence under a settler government 
but this independence was not officially recognized by a single foreign government 
as being legal. From March 1978 until December 1979 it was ruled by an internal 
settlement. In the period up until 1 June 1979 that internal settlement consisted of 
an Executive Committee (Exco), comprised of the four signatories to the settlement 
with each rotating in turn as chairman of the Exco and with black deputy ministers 
for each white minister in the cabinet. 
Before 1961 blacks had no voting rights in the country even though — or 
rather, because — they made up at least 90 to 95 percent of the population. After 
1961 a qualified franchise was created that gave blacks one quarter of the seats in 
parliament, but this was a ceiling with no prospect for peaceful change. Since World 
War II the chiefs had become salaried government employees and lost their 
traditional authority and respect among the majority populations. The whites, who 
during the 1970s numbered between a quarter million and 270,000, were only about 
3.5 percent of the population but had all the power. 
El Salvador became an independent republic with the collapse of the Central 
American Federation in 1838. Until 1932, it was ruled by the white oligarchy — 
a small (20 to 30) group of families that owned most of the wealth in the country.6 
In 1932 the military took control and ruled for the next fifty years on behalf of itself 
and the oligarchy. Although the population of El Salvador is only 10 percent white, 
the oligarchy is entirely white, and the rest of the population is either pure Indian 
(10 percent) or mestizo (79 percent) — that is non-white. El Salvador can be said 
to be a settler colony like others in Latin America and Southern Africa.7 New York 
Times correspondent James LeMoyne called it "one of the sickest societies in Latin 
America." He described the system of government as: 
Its archaic social structure remains basically colonial... a tiny urban 
elite and dominating caste of army officers essentially rule, but do not 
effectively govern, an illiterate, disease-ridden and frustrated major-
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ity of peasants and urban slum-dwellers . . . there is not now, nor has 
there ever been, a just legal system.8 
THE INTERNAL PARTIES 
Because of the calibre of internal leaders involved, the Salvadoran internal 
settlement can best be compared to the Rhodesian internal settlement, which was the 
most forthcoming of the internal settlements in Southern Africa. The Rhodesian 
internal settlement was formed between the Rhodesian Front government and three 
black parties. These three parties included ZUPO;9 the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's 
rump of ZANU;10 and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC.11 The first party was 
actually created by the Rhodesian government and its leader was basically acting 
as an agent of the Rhodesian Front during the negotiations. This left Sithole's 
ZANU, which had little popular support or membership, and the UANC, which in 
1977 was the most popular party in the country. 
Muzorewa had from December 1971 until December 1974 led the internal 
surrogate for the two banned liberation movements and from December 1974 to 
October 1976 was the nominal head of the nationalist movement. He had considerable 
popular support in the cities and among the Manyika tribe of the Shona people.12 He 
was popular because of his role as a figurehead in rejecting the deal between Ian 
Smith's Rhodesian Front government and the Conservative government of Prime 
Minister Douglas Home of Britain to lift sanctions in exchange for majority rule 
sometime in the twenty-first century. Because of his leadership role and his moderation 
he was popular with Western politicians in Britain and the United States.13 As a 
moderate with widespread popular and international support he was the ideal internal 
candidate for a settlement. Muzorewa and Sithole had actually been "external leaders" 
during the mid-1970s from late 1974 until mid-1977.14 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, an American-educated engineer and a leading civic 
figure in El Salvador before entering politics in 1960 was the Salvadoran equivalent 
of Bishop Muzorewa.15 He is of mestizo origin coming from a poor family that 
moved up economically after his father won the national lottery. He was a founder 
of the Christian Democratic Party of El Salvador in November 1960 and one of eight 
on its ruling council. In 1964 he became mayor of San Salvador, the capital and 
largest city in the country, and remained mayor for three terms until 1970. He 
organized a popular civic defense of the capital during the "soccer war" of 1969 with 
Honduras. On the strength of his service as mayor he ran for president in March 
1972 but was deprived of the election through widespread vote fraud — detected 
because the military originally underestimated how much ballot box stuffing was 
necessary — which in turn triggered an abortive coup and led to his exile in 
Venezuela until late 1979. 
ORIGINS OF THE SETTLEMENTS 
In Rhodesia the internal settlement came about after the collapse of the 
Geneva conference in December 1976, and the recognition of the Patriotic Front by 
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the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Zimbabwean people, which left both Muzorewa and Sithole politically isolated. 
The whites, pressured by an escalation of the war along with continued sanctions 
and increased white emigration, decided to coopt Sithole and Muzorewa. They 
gambled that they could still retain real power in their own hands and yet win foreign 
recognition and a lifting of sanctions following elections for a "majority rule" 
government. 
In El Salvador the internal settlement occurred after reformers within the 
military, linked with civilians, convinced their fellow officers that reform was 
preferable to sharing the fate of the Nicaraguan National Guard under Somoza.16 A 
coup took place on 15 October 1979 and a junta was inaugurated that included 
Duarte's vice-presidential running mate from 1972, Guillermo Ungo, the rector of 
the Catholic university, Ramon Mayorga Quiros, a representative of the business 
community, Mario Antonio Andino, and two prominent military officers. 
In late December 1979 a showdown took place between the military 
reformers and civilians, and the conservative officers. Colonel Vides Casanova told 
the junta that the military would continue to take orders from Minister of Defense 
Jose Garcia rather than from the junta. He went on to inform the civilians that, 
We have put you into the position where you are, and for the things that 
are needed here, we don't need you. We have been running this country 
for fifty years, and we are quite prepared to keep on running it.17 
The civilian members of the junta resigned as did every minister from the 
government with the exception of Garcia between 3 and 4 January 1980. 
Duarte divided the army into three camps: reformist officers, supporters of 
ARENA, and supporters of the army's institutional role and traditional privilege. 
Nearly all of the first group had been eliminated by the end of the rebel "final 
offensive" of January 1981 by either being purged or by electing to join the 
guerrillas. '8 This meant that the Christian Democrats had to depend on the last group 
who were not open supporters of the oligarchy. Reagan's Ambassador to El 
Salvador Dean Hinton reported to Washington frankly that, "The PDC [Christian 
Democrats] without the army would be nothing." The State Department's human 
rights bureau wrote to Secretary of State Alexander Haig in March 1981 that, "The 
government of El Salvador is not Duarte's but rather effectively controlled by a 
council of senior army officers . . .." Those identified as being in control were 
divided between the last two groups mentioned above.19 
At this point a small insurgency, which had been building since the fraudu-
lent elections of 1977, escalated dramatically as the guerrillas moved to preempt 
reformist measures by the junta and the military attempted to crush the insurgency. 
The Christian Democrats were divided between those who wanted to participate in 
the government and those who wanted to stay out until elections were held. Duarte 
was in favor of staying outside of government in order not to become tainted by 
collusion with the military. A compromise was reached whereby the Christian 
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Democrats would join in exchange for the removal of Garcia as Defense Minister, 
and the resignation of the head of the Treasury Police and a vice-minister said to be 
connected with the death squads. The military agreed to these demands but then 
failed to carry them out once the Christian Democrats joined the government. 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
During the last two years of the Rhodesian bush war, which overlapped with 
the internal settlement, the real white leaders were the commanders of the armed 
forces who ordered cross-border raids into Mozambique and Zambia without even 
bothering to consult their civilian counterparts until after the fact. This pattern 
began under the Rhodesian Front and continued after the UANC was in charge of 
the government. The insurgency also escalated a month after the initiation of the 
internal settlement in March 1978 as the Patriotic Front attempted to demonstrate 
that there could be no peace without it. 
Likewise, in El Salvador the military continued its repression and the death 
squads — financed by the oligarchy, led by officers, and manned by soldiers, police 
and civilians — continued to operate. During the first six months of 1980 some 
2,065 people were killed by the security forces, army, and police and by the end of 
the year this figure had topped 9,000.20 Between October 1979 and January 1984 
some 40,000 innocent civilians were murdered in El Salvador according to the legal 
aid office of the Roman Catholic church in the country.21 Both the death squads and 
the guerrillas seemed to have an interest in preventing real reforms like agrarian 
reform, which could win popular support for the government.22 The oligarchy 
wanted to thwart any move that would limit its power and wealth. 
In addition to the death squads, which sprang mainly from the "internal 
security" branches of the military such as the Treasury Police, the army itself was 
guilty of major human rights violations in its normal activity in the field. An editor 
for Pacific News Service, Mary Jo McConahay, claimed that peasants reported that 
the Salvadoran air force attacked "anything that moves" in guerrilla-controlled 
zones and that peasants regularly fled their homes to hide in caves when the army 
swept through these areas burning the peasants' crops in order to prevent them from 
being used to feed the guerrillas.23 In March 1985 Berkeley Mayor Gus Newport 
and a "reporter" travelled to Chalatenango province in El Salvador. They were 
present during a Salvadoran army sweep through a pro-guerrilla zone. The two 
reported on what they had witnessed. 
The army is destroying fields and homes. We observed lots of land 
that had been burned by mortars. They can start fires which can burn 
for days. The army drops incendiary rockets, gasoline rockets. We 
saw lots of land — acres and acres — that had been charred. When 
the Salvadoran Army invades they always burn the crops and destroy 
the waterpipes in the villages. The cut down the fruit trees, kill the 
cows, destroy all the tools they find. Fishing boats are sunk.24 
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Just as in Rhodesia, many civilians were killed in "crossfire" when the army 
attacked guerrillas who were among peasants. The striking thing in both countries 
was that the militaries seemed ready to kill any number of civilians in order to get 
at even one guerrilla. In the second half of 1984 two major massacres took place: 
one in July in Los Llanitos in Cabanas Department in which 68 people were 
massacred, roughly half of them children; and another where at least 50 civilians 
were killed in August in Chalatenango Department when 600 villagers escorted by 
guerrillas were attacked while fleeing the village of Las Vueltas.25 On 14 May 1980 
over 600 civilians were killed in or along the Sampul River border with Honduras. 
The Honduran army cooperated in preventing the victims from escaping into 
Honduras while the soldiers and members of the death squads murdered the 
unarmed peasants.26 In October 1984, according to Tutela Legal (Legal Trust), a 
Catholic human rights organization in San Salvador, 107 people died from political 
violence. Ofthese 101 were killed by death squads, thearmy or asaresultofmilitary 
actions compared to only six killed by the guerrillas. That is, more than 94 percent 
of the political deaths were caused by those connected with the ruling regime.27 
Although Rhodesia lacked death squads as such, human rights abuses by the 
military eroded the early high levels of support for Bishop Muzorewa's UANC 
party among blacks. The army continued to function in Rhodesia after the internal 
settlement much as it had before. The same holds true for El Salvador, with the 
exception that killings by the death squads diminished somewhat after 1982. In 
Rhodesia total deaths in the war from 1972 to 1979 were estimated at between thirty 
and fifty thousand whereas in El Salvador total deaths at the end of the twelve year 
civil war were estimated at 75,000 or more. And this despite the fact that by the end 
of the war in El Salvador the guerrillas there numbered at most about half as many 
as the guerrillas in Rhodesia.28 
In both countries the insurgencies were primarily rural based and only 
secondarily based on the poorer neighborhoods of the cities. (Although much of the 
guerrilla leadership in both countries was of urban origin as were many guerrillas.) 
Unfortunately for the internal settlements, both the UANC and the Christian 
Democrats were mostly urban parties. Duarte himself wrote that his party had been 
basically destroyed by 1980 and had to be rebuilt from scratch once he returned from 
exile.29 Because the other two main political parties in El Salvador, Roberto 
D'Aubuisson's ARENA and the PCN (National Reconciliation Party), were the 
instruments of the oligarchy and the military respectively, this left the countryside 
largely to the organizing efforts of the various guerrilla groups united in the 
Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Many of the mayors of the 
smaller towns and villages were Christian Democrats, but they were vulnerable and 
fell victim to murder or kidnapping by the guerrillas.30 
In the cities the Christian Democrats competed with the guerrillas for the 
loyalty of the poor and working class inhabitants and with ARENA for the support 
of the middle class and business community. A similar process occurred in 
Rhodesia where the UANC competed with the Patriotic Front in the rural areas and 
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the townships and the right wing whites opposed to the internal settlement competed 
with the Rhodesian Front for support in the white suburbs. In both cases the internal 
settlements ended up having few supporters beyond those already supporting the 
regime. The internal settlements did little to transform the lives of the peasants in 
either Rhodesia or El Salvador. Meanwhile, white settlers, the business community 
and the oligarchy resented what meagre demands were made on their wealth in the 
form of land reform or the sharing of government. In Rhodesia the internal 
settlement benefitted at best a few thousand middle class blacks who could afford 
to either move into white neighborhoods in the cities, buy up white farm land when 
racial barriers to land sales were repealed, or who benefitted by winning positions 
in the government.31 
In El Salvador the primary beneficiaries of the internal settlement among the 
poor were the few thousand peasants who managed to take advantage of the first 
phase of land reform that was instituted in March 1980.32 The oligarchy employed 
the death squads to dispossess peasants from the land that they had claimed under 
the agrarian reforms and utilized its power in the legislative assembly to kill the land 
reforms in 1981.33 In the United States Senator Jesse Helms exerted his clout to pass 
a provision prohibiting the use of American funds to pay for compensation for land 
seized as part of agrarian reforms or for companies nationalized. This prevented 
payment of compensation and hence the execution of land reforms.34 Duarte could 
not afford to simply seize plantations and turn them over to peasants as he was not 
running a revolutionary government and was dependent for support on a conserva-
tive Republican administration.35 
In January 1981, shortly before the guerrillas' "final offensive" failed, two 
American advisors working on land reform and their Salvadoran colleague were 
murdered by a death squad. The killers were eventually caught and they implicated 
an army officer, Captain Avila, in the murders. But under Salvadoran law their 
confessions are inadmissible in court and no one has yet been tried or punished for 
the murders. The land reform was in many ways designed in Washington on the 
basis of land reforms in East Asia created to prevent a revolution. There is some 
speculation that one or both of the assassinated Americans worked for the Central 
Intelligence Agency.36 
THE REAL POWER IN THE SETTLEMENTS 
In the case of Rhodesia the limitations on the power of the blacks participat-
ing in the settlement resulted from the initial agreement establishing the internal 
settlement that was signed on 3 March 1978. In the agreement the black parties 
recognized that the military, police, civil service, and judiciary should remain 
"professional" and not be subject to "political interference." This principle, along 
with the continued payment of government pensions, was conceded quite early in 
the three-month negotiations which centered mostly on the question of how many 
seats the whites would be guaranteed in parliament. Under the new constitution, 
which was ready in early 1979, and which went into effect on 1 June 1979, a series 
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of small commissions dominated by members of the establishment were set up to 
control these institutions. The qualifications for participation on the commissions 
were ostensibly non-racial but in practice the chairman of each commission was 
required to have a certain specified rank within the establishment — a rank that 
would have been impossible for blacks to obtain. This subterfuge proved to be quite 
transparent in practice and was one of the main reasons why the Carter Administra-
tion refused to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.37 
In El Salvador the devices used to block power were more varied. The first 
means of limiting the power of the Christian Democrats occurred in early 1980 when 
it was decided to award the presidency of the j unta—the chairmanship—to Duarte, 
in December 1980, while naming the military ' s candidate as the country ' s president 
in 1982. Duarte complained that he was denied real executive powers as president 
of the junta and blamed not only the military for this but also his own party which 
apparently feared that he might become a dictator.38 In March 1982 after elections 
for a sixty-member National Assembly failed to give the Christian Democrats an 
outright majority,39 the military summoned both Duarte and D'Aubuisson in turn 
and informed them that neither of them would be president. The military then gave 
a list of three candidates that it found acceptable to the National Assembly from 
among which to select a president, but made clear who their favorite was. After fifty 
years the military was still selecting the president of the country.40 
The new president, Al varo Alfredo Magana, was a banker who for seventeen 
years had headed the country's mortgage bank. During this time he often gave loans 
to officers who were not good credit risks. The reformist officers had wanted to put 
him on trial immediately following the October 1979 coup but were prevented from 
doing so by their more conservative fellow officers. A year after he was elected 
president he would openly admit, "I have no power, no authority."41 Duarte writes 
simply that, "Magana had no political base, so he provided no buffer to the 
pressures." He went on to mention that the president used to visit the defense 
minister, which was the usual procedure in El Salvador rather than the other way 
around, as in most countries.42 It would be another two years before direct 
presidential elections were held. 
Even after Duarte was elected president in March 1984 with 54 percent of the 
vote, he still faced an assembly that was dominated by the combined forces of the 
right. Duarte had only beaten a challenger by one vote—only because he voted for 
himself while the challenger also voted for Duarte — to win his party's backing as 
presidential candidate.43 
In this weakness he resembled Bishop Muzorewa who was reduced from 
having a slight majority to a plurality by the defection of seven of his members of 
parliament who formed their own party based on ethnic identity.44 This left 
Muzorewa dependent on the settler Rhodesian Front party for support. The 
constitution had called for a coalition government in any event, and Muzorewa only 
benefitted from Sithole's self-exclusion due to the latter's sensitivity over having 
lost the elections by such a wide margin. 
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James LeMoyne credits the Duarte government with having eliminated 
military massacres of civilians, lowering the overall number of political murders 
and executing some land reform.45 But the overall economic situation of the country 
was much worse off than at the beginning of the decade. Per capita income had 
declined by one-third since the start of the decade and the unemployment rate 
bordered on 50 percent.46 The ARENA election victory was explained in terms of 
a widespread perception that the Christian Democrats were both corrupt and 
economically incompetent.47 People began to refer to the devalued one colon coins 
as "Duartes" because "no one wanted either of them."48 
ELECTIONS 
The National Assembly then arranged to have a two-part election with the top 
two candidates from the first round facing off in the second so that the rightist vote 
would not be split between ARENA and the PCN and allow Duarte to win by default. 
The official count from the first round gave Duarte 43.4 percent to 29 percent for 
D'Aubuisson and 16 percent for the PCN's candidate. Duarte claims to have won 
the second round by getting out the vote among those in villages who abstained in 
the first round, whereas D'Aubuisson attracted only the combined vote total for 
himself and the PCN candidate.49 D'Aubuisson demanded that the election results 
be declared void and Duarte claims that the military uncovered an assassination plot 
against him by ARENA. President Reagan was alarmed enough to dispatch special 
envoy Vernon Walters to El Salvador to warn D'Aubuisson off.50 
The military probably preferred a weakened Duarte to an unpredictable 
D'Aubuisson whose election might lead to a severance of aid by Congress for El 
Salvador. Most in the military high command probably favored the PCN candidate, 
however he, Chachi Guerrero, lacked the charisma of both Duarte and D'Aubuisson. 
In the next presidential elections five years later in March 1989 ARENA put 
up a wealthy landowner, Alfredo Cristiani, as its presidential candidate, instead of 
D'Aubuisson, who was connected to the death squads and the assassination of 
Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980, according to former American Ambas-
sador Robert White.51 By then the Christian Democrats had been discredited as a 
party of corruption and incompetence which had been unable to either end the war 
or improve the economy. By the mid-1980s unemployment officially stood at 36 
percent and unemployment and underemployment combined stood at 60 percent.52 
Duarte was dying of cancer and his successor had little charisma. The Christian 
Democrats were unable to attract the high level of rural support that they had 
enjoyed in 1984 and so lost to the combined votes of supporters of ARENA and the 
PCN. Cristiani had the support of the middle class and the business community, 
including many mestizos. In this second presidential election since the 1979 coup, 
the American Embassy was no longer as openly partisan in favor of the Christian 
Democrats as it had been when D'Aubuisson had been the alternative. 
The guerrillas probably favored the election of the ARENA candidate as it 
might mean a reduction in the level of American support for the ruling regime. In 
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April 1979 guerrillas in the Mudzi Tribal Trustland of Rhodesia instructed voters 
to vote for Muzorewa rather than Sithole.53 This may have been because they were 
"closet" Muzorewa supporters, but more likely it was because Muzorewa was 
considered to be less competent than Sithole and because Sithole had fallen out with 
the guerrilla leadership in the mid-1970s. 
D'Aubuisson's reaction to his loss in 1984 is similar to that of Sithole 
following the April 1979 internal elections. Sithole, after praising the election 
procedures at the start of the five-day balloting, proceeded to cry foul when the 
results became apparent. Sithole had convinced himself that he was the most 
popular man in Rhodesia and he failed to believe otherwise when the voters 
disagreed—therefore the results had to have been rigged by the government.54 This 
accusation served to discredit the election further among foreign observers. 
To read Raymond Bonner's chapter on the 25 March 1982 National Assem-
bly elections is almost like reading a description of the Namibian internal elections 
of December 1978 or the Rhodesian internal elections of April 1979. In all three 
cases the left was effectively banned from the elections: in Rhodesia by explicit 
bans, including prohibitions against the Patriotic Front's internal wings and a pro-
PF newspaper, The Zimbabwe Times; in Namibia and El Salvador this was 
accomplished by extra-legal harassment of the left by the security forces. In 
Namibia the internal wing of S W APO" had never been banned but was continually 
harassed by the South African Defense Force which imprisoned its activists and 
often broke up its rallies or prevented them from being staged. 
In El Salvador the death squads served the same function by effectively 
ensuring that the left would not dare to campaign openly. In 1989 after the level of 
repression had been reduced the left did participate in the elections. Several senior 
leaders of the pro-guerrilla Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) were murdered 
by a death squad in November 1980. The military issued a communique in March 
1981 that described the FDR and Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary 
Movement (MNR) as "terrorist groups" and which included a list of 138 "traitors" 
among whom were nearly the entire leadership of both parties.56 This intimidation 
led to the self-exclusion of all groups on the left of the Christian Democrats from 
participation in the election process until 1989. By excluding the names of members 
of ARENA and the Christian Democrats from the list the armed forces were giving 
their stamp of approval to these two parties. But death squads continued to murder 
local Christian Democrat politicians in the countryside. Between 1980 and 1983 
more than 260 of the PDC's leaders were murdered with many of these killings 
being tied to former members of the ORDEN death squad which became part of 
ARENA.57 
In the March 1989 presidential elections the voters had a wider choice when 
the left, the FDR under the label of "Democratic Convergence," participated for the 
first time since 1972. But because the guerrillas made threats against voters and poll 
watchers and carried out several attacks on election day this discredited their 
civilian "representatives" who received only some 3.8 percent of the vote compared 
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with 54 percent for ARENA.58 But the voter turnout was limited to about half of the 
electorate.59 
In Rhodesia the black population was effectively given a choice between 
Sithole and Muzorewa, as the platform's of their respective parties were nearly 
identical, as well as an Ndebele Senator-Chief who ran as an unauthorized surrogate 
for one of the leaders of the Patriotic Front.60 In Namibia the blacks were given a 
choice that came down to voting for the ethnic coalition supporting the internal 
settlement, which was led by a white farmer, or for the front led by the National Party 
which thought that the internal settlement was too liberal. This was in essence the 
same range of choices that voters had in El Salvador up until 1989. 
In all three countries the inhabitants carried identity documents which could 
be checked for proof that one had voted or other means of pressuring voters to at least 
register. In Rhodesia, Namibia, and El Salvador there is considerable evidence of 
military pressure on peasants in rural areas to vote.61 During the election campaign 
period of March-May 1984 Salvadoran military helicopters flew at three to four 
times their previous frequency. The stated aim was to enhance security for the 
elections.62 This sounds similar to the Rhodesian practice of "escorting" peasant 
voters to the polls. By contrast, only in Rhodesia was there a sustained systematic 
effort to prevent the internal elections. In El Salvador a few minor incidents of 
guerrillas firing on polling booths occurred, but only one major battle and less than 
a dozen fire fights.63 Threats and intimidation of voters appear to have been a local 
phenomenon undertaken by individual guerrilla leaders rather than the FMLN or 
even any one of its component organizations. A slogan "Vote in the morning, die 
in the afternoon" was widely reported in the American media but it was only found 
in one location. The FMLN's clandestine Radio Venceremos instructed Salvadorans 
five days before the elections not to worry about whether or not they voted as the 
elections were meaningless.64 In February 1984 the guerrilla leaders of the FMLN 
announced that they would not interfere in the presidential election to be held the 
following month on the advice of the FDR. This was essentially the attitude to the 
Namibian internal elections adopted by SWAPO in December 1978. 
One American activist, Frank Brodhead, who specialized in American 
counterinsurgency policy compared the Salvadoran elections of 1982-85 with those 
held in the Dominican Republic in 1966 and in South Vietnam in 1967.65 He labeled 
all of these "demonstration elections" designed to buy American public support for 
American aid to a particular regime by convincing the public that the regime was 
legitimate by way of democratic elections. He pointed out that the American 
government spent between six and eight million dollars just for the computers to 
count the election returns.66 He was very critical of American media coverage of 
the elections for not applying the same skepticism toward these elections and those 
in Eastern Europe from 1946 on. For the reasons cited above he concluded that the 
elections were not free. The same rationale applies to the internal elections in 
Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent, in Namibia, which were designed more for the 
consumption of the American and British publics and ruling elites than for the 
populations of those countries. 
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When the Carter Administration rejected the Rhodesian internal elections of 
April 1979 as not being free and fair it did not argue that they were fraudulent. 
Rather, it argued that the black population had had no say in the formulation of the 
new constitution and no chance to accept or reject it, that the election excluded 
important political elements (the Patriotic Front) and that the terms of the constitu-
tion fell short of majority rule. All these same arguments could be applied to the 
Salvadoran internal settlement and the elections of 1982,1984 and 1985. The left 
was excluded by the death squads which had a semi-official character, the popula-
tion had little say in the formulation of the constitution which the right-wing 
controlled assembly produced and effective power continued to reside in the 
military rather than in the civilian leaders. The Rhodesian elections were originally 
hailed by the Republican Party in the United States, the United States Senate, and 
the British Conservative Party as free and fair and an alternative to "Marxist 
terrorism." Similar arguments were made by the Reagan Administration and in 
Congress by members of both parties with regard to El Salvador. 
In both cases a similar logic held. By African standards (only Botswana and 
Gambia have been consistently democratic) the internal elections in both Rhodesia 
and Namibia were democratic but clearly unrepresentative of the wishes of the 
population. By Central American standards (where in the 1980s only Costa Rica 
was a democracy) the same can be said of the elections in El Salvador.67 Because 
El Salvador, unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, has had a long-established international 
identity as a sovereign state it is not held to the same standards as Rhodesia and 
Namibia. The standards it should be held to, however, are those of its propaganda 
and the propaganda of the American government on its behalf. If it claims to be a 
democracy it should be held to democratic standards, which it has clearly failed to 
meet. As a major recipient of American aid it must identify its claim to this aid on 
some ideological or security grounds. 
BATTLEFIELD 
This raises the issue of the communist threat to Central America. El Salvador 
was perceived by Secretary of State Haig as an ideal Cold War battleground in early 
1981: it was close to the United States, within range of the American navy, and 
compared to Guatemala or Nicaragua under Somoza it had a respectable govern-
ment. Haig was too much of a Cold Warrior to resist the temptation. The State 
Department's Latin American team under Carter had been purged by Reagan in the 
largest shakeup since the McCarthy era and replaced with people with experience 
in Europe and South East Asia.68 
Margaret Thatcher was restrained by pragmatic Foreign Minister Lord 
Carrington from turning Rhodesia into a Cold War battlefield between Britain and 
communist guerrillas. The Conservative Party's monitoring group led by former 
Colonial Secretary Lord Boyd produced a report favorable to the Rhodesian 
elections as did the American Conservative Union's team and Freedom House's 
delegation. White Rhodesians did not hold out much hope of support from the 
54 
Conflict Quarterly 
Carter Administration but the election of Thatcher as prime minister in May 1979 
was hailed as a change of fortune. Thatcher was inclined to recognize Muzorewa's 
government and lift sanctions and she was supported in this by the right wing of her 
party, including Winston Churchill II. Carrington, however, was concerned by the 
effect that British recognition, or even a lifting of sanctions without recognition, 
would have on Britain's relations with Africa and the Commonwealth. Nigeria had 
nationalized British Petroleum over this issue in summer 1979. 
There was no pressure similar to that of the Commonwealth on Reagan in 
1981 to counteract his conservative anticommunist views. Unlike Britain, the 
United States was a superpower, and the Salvadoran left did not have the level of 
support in Latin America and the Third World that the Patriotic Front had. One of 
the raisons d'etre of the OAU was the elimination of white minority rule in sub-
Saharan Africa. The Organization of American States paid lip service to democracy 
but had no real crusade planned against military regimes. It had no Liberation 
Committee, like the OAU's, dedicated to the overthrow of military regimes. The 
Salvadoran left lacked the support among Democrats that the Patriotic Front had 
among Laborites in the British opposition. And the United States did not share a 
constitutional monarch with any other countries or organization. All these factors 
combined to make the American response to the Salvadoran internal settlement 
different from the American and British response to the Rhodesian internal 
settlement.69 
Even the Carter Administration had a very different attitude toward El 
Salvador than toward Rhodesia. Following the October 1979 coup the administra-
tion sponsored five million dollars in military aid for the Salvadoran army without 
making it conditional on immediate elections or democratic reforms. The American 
Embassy in San Salvador was much more critical under Ambassador Robert White, 
who was present only from mid-March 1980 until January 1981, than under Dean 
Hinton. White had the mission of preventing a revolution. This would be 
accomplished mainly through political and socio-economic means as opposed to 
the military ones favored by his successor.70 Duarte had the following to say about 
the Carter Administration's attitude towards El Salvador: 
When Ronald Reagan was elected president, we did not know what to 
expect. The Right celebrated his election victory, firing guns into the 
air. They were sure that Reagan would sympathize with their 
preference for a strong, authoritarian government. The oligarchy did 
not believe that a good conservative such as Reagan would prop up 
"leftist" Christian Democrats in a government. Under President 
Carter, the United States championed agrarian reform and human 
rights, opposing the military officers who wanted to do away with the 
junta.71 
The right was not to be disappointed as both the death toll in El Salvador and 
the level of American aid to El Salvador increased dramatically. Aid increased from 
$25 million in 1981, to $82 million for fiscal year 1982, to $136 million for fiscal 
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year 1983 and in January 1984 the White House announced that it would seek $300 
million in military aid alone through fiscal year 1985.72 By November 1989 the 
United States had supplied over $4 billion in aid to the Sal vadoran government since 
the beginning of 1981, with over a billion of this figure as military aid. Since 1984 
this amounted to a daily subsidy of $1.5 million.73 
While the guerrillas did not grow exponentially like the Patriotic Front did 
from 1976 to 1980 in Rhodesia, they more than managed to replace their combat 
losses and even to increase. The guerrillas grew from about 2,000 at the time of the 
"final offensive" in January 1981 to three times that number in mid-1983. By 
February 1984 the Embassy was claiming that there were between 9,000 and 12,000 
guerrillas in El Salvador, although some reporters thought this might be an 
exaggeration designed to justify increased military aid.74 By the end of 1984 the 
official estimate of guerrilla strength stood at between 10,000 and 14,000.75 
Following the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 the American Embassy in San 
Salvador concluded that there were more than 6,000 rebels under arms.76 
Unlike the Patriotic Front guerrillas who were openly supplied through 
China, the Soviet Union, the East bloc, and African countries and operated from 
"sanctuaries" in Mozambique and Zambia,77 the Salvadoran guerrillas operated 
without secure rear bases and with little foreign military support.78 The rebels did 
receive some M-16s from Vietnam and some arms and training from Cuba, and 
guerrilla commanders could use Nicaragua as a site for periodic vacations, but that 
was the extent of foreign support. This aid increased considerably during the late 
1980s,79 possibly as a consequence of the Contra War which left the United States 
with little credible bargaining power in reserve with which to threaten Nicaragua. 
The main reason why the Rhodesian guerrillas had not done even better was 
that the Rhodesian military was a very competent and professional military which 
lacked the corruption of the Salvadoran military. In El Salvador the military was 
traditionally a means of advancement for people from the lower-middle class who 
had no conscience or scruples. Advancement occurred on the basis of time in 
service and connections rather than merit.80 Many of the soldiers were from the poor 
who were swept off the streets by the army or police and forced to serve. The 
guerrillas through a policy of encouraging surrender were able to rearm themselves 
by taking the weapons, ammunition and supplies of captured soldiers and by buying 
additional arms on the black market in Miami.81 
In November 1989 following two rounds of unsuccessful negotiations with 
the Cristiani government the rebels mounted a general offensive in San Salvador 
and six other major provincial towns. The offensive involved some 3500 rebels and 
resulted in the rebel takeover of some of the poorer barrios of San Salvador for 
several days. The government resorted to strafing and bombing these neighborhoods 
from the air, creating tens of thousands of refugees and hundreds of civilian dead 
in the process. The rebels managed to take over the wealthy Escalon district of the 
capital and hold some forty houses before melting away into the countryside. They 
even trapped American military advisors temporarily in the Sheraton Hotel. The 
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offensive was condemned by Guillermo Ungo's MNR party and by Ruben 
Zamora, Ungo's partner in the Democratic Convergence. But the rebel offensive, 
like the January 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, demonstrated that the guerrillas 
were far from being a spent force, although it cost them as many as 1,000 dead to 
accomplish this.82 
CONCLUSION 
The internal settlement demonstrated that it was a massive failure in 
accomplishing the last two goals mentioned at the beginning of this article: winning 
popular support and causing guerrilla defection. Although the PDC was popular in 
1984, as the UANC had been in 1977-78, it ended up losing to the anti-settlement 
ARENA in 1989. This was caused by its economic mismanagement and the 
repressive tactics of the military. There is no record of any numerically significant 
guerrilla defections during the 1980s. However, the Salvadoran internal settlement 
was very successful in terms of accomplishing its first and primary goal: winning 
outside support for the regime. This enabled it to conclude an agreement with the 
FMLN on New Year's Day 1992 that was favorable to the regime, certainly by 
comparison with the Lancaster House agreement. 
There are two differences between the African internal settlements and the 
Salvadoran one which account for the relative success of the latter. First, the former 
involved pariah regimes that were either considered illegal or, at the very least, were 
isolated in the United Nations and other international organization, whereas the 
Salvadoran regime was a member in good standing of both the United Nations and 
the Organization of American States. Second, the outside power in the case of 
Rhodesia was as much South Africa as it was Britain and the United States. But 
Pretoria could offer Rhodesia only limited support and needed the legitimacy of 
British and other support for the settlement to succeed. Britain was restrained by 
its Commonwealth ties and economic investments in Africa. The United States, a 
superpower in the eighties and the superpower in the nineties, was not similarly 
restrained as regards El Salvador. 
This may encourage other Central American regimes faced with domestic 
unrest and revolution, particularly in Honduras and Guatemala, and other American 
allies to attempt internal settlements. Staying in power in a stalemate for a decade 
is much better than losing outright, especially when the tab is being picked up by 
outsiders. The question is: will Washington be so willing to support internal 
settlements with the Cold War over, especially once Fidel Castro leaves power? 
The Salvadoran internal settlement's success has already caused it to be 
imitated by Guatemala which held civilian elections in late 1985 that resulted in 
Venicio Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, being inaugurated as president in January 
1986. The Guatemalan internal settlement under the Cerezo presidency (1986-90) 
was in many ways a repeat of the Salvadoran settlement. Days before Cerezo's 
inauguration the military government declared a blanket amnesty for all military 
personnel which Cerezo allowed to stand. Those who had reputations for brutality 
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and repression remained in command in the military and the violations of human 
rights continued. Human rights institutions never seriously challenged the military. 
But Cerezo was able to use his name and legitimacy to gather foreign funding for 
Guatemala from the United States government and participation in programs by 
Harvard and other universities.83 
During the 1980s under prodding from Washington the Honduran military 
allowed civilians to take over the government as long as they gave the military free 
reign. Because the American government needed the cooperation of the Honduran 
military to wage its covert Contra war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua 
it allied itself with the military. So nothing had really changed in Honduras.84 
Washington poured over $ 1.2 billion into Honduras between 1982 and 1989, which 
accounted for more than half of the government's revenue and was an enormous 
amount for a country of only 4.4 million people.85 But because there was neither an 
insurgency nor a credible revolutionary threat to the military in Honduras the facade 
cannot really be labeled an internal settlement. Unlike El Salvador and Guatemala, 
Honduras lacks a white oligarchy and the great disparities in wealth between rich 
and poor.86 Thus it is less of a candidate for an internal settlement than Guatemala. 
This article demonstrates that the internal settlement is valid beyond South-
ern Africa. However, this validity is not universal. It is most applicable to areas, 
similar to the settler regimes of Southern Africa, where a racial, ethnic, or religious 
minority rules over a majority that is both ethnically or religiously different and 
oppressed. That oppression creates, or results from, a clear class cleavage, which 
is at least partially along ethnic or religious communal lines, so that all of the ruling 
elite before the internal settlement belong to the same community in either ethnic 
or religious terms. It is this cleavage that breeds the insurgency for which the 
internal settlement is envisaged as a cure. 
Also, it is most applicable to those areas where the ruling minority either faces 
international sanctions or is dependent upon, or hopes for, outside support from a 
foreign power. Two situations that fit these conditions come to mind: the West Bank 
and Gaza/Palestine and Northern Ireland.87 In the former case, a preliminary attempt 
at the creation of an alternative Palestinian leadership—the Village Leagues — failed 
miserably in the early 1980s.88 In the latter case an internal settlement has yet to be 
attempted, but could result from future British-Irish cooperation. 
In neither situation, however, will an internal settlement occur unless there 
is outside pressure for fundamental reform, which forces the ruling regime to 
pretend to seek a negotiated settlement with the majority. But that pretence does not 
necessarily have to take the form of an internal settlement. It could take the form 
of autonomy.89 An internal settlement in Northern Ireland is more likely to come 
about to appease the European Community or a weary British public than to satisfy 
the United States (or Ireland). In all cases, however, an internal settlement is likely 
to fail as long as it is merely seen as a pretence that permits the ruling elite to cling 
to power. For without real change, only the first goal can be met and, at best, that 
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in 1987. During the November 1989 offensive a Cessna aircraft with 24 SA-7 missiles crashed in 
El Salvador and the Nicaraguan government didn't even bother to deny that the arms were from 
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claims that the rebels also bought arms from corrupt officials in Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Panama. 
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83. See Clifford Krmss, Inside Central America (New York: Summit, 1991 ), pp. 43-52, for the Cerezo 
presidency. 
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85. Ibid., p. 196. 
86. Honduras is mainly mestizo — racially mixed of Indian and white blood. Costa Rica is primarily 
white. El Salvador is primarily mestizo but the oligarchy is white. Guatemala is primarily mestizo, 
but with a white oligarchy that sides with the mestizos in repressing the large Mayan Indian 
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